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".n:~TEH:Y RAILROAD COMPANY, 
J 1'<1qm1ntion, 






ST'ATEMEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Thi::: is an action to rerover damages for personal 
injuries m·ising out of a railroad crossing accident. 
D lSPOSITION IN LOvVER C01JRT 
The trial court granted defendant's motion for di-
l'f'dt•d wrdid at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and 
"ubsequently entered judgment on the verdict dismissing 
tlie action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff S<'l'lrn reversal of the judgment below and 
an ordpr granting a new trial. 
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STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
The defendant offered no evidence i·n "· f l view o tie 
trial court's rnling on the motion for directed verdict. 
Accordingly, the only evidence before the court is that 
presented during the course of plaintiff's case. The 
Statement of Facts prepared by counsel for plaintiff i~ 
correct but incomplete. ~Vv e shall attempt to supplement 
the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief 
m those particulars deemed material to the appeal. 
At the crossing where the accident occurred ther1: 
are eight tracks which cross Fourth North Street. The 
collision occurred on the western-most track which is the 
main line of the Denver & Rio Grande vV estern Railroad 
Company. Thus, the automobile in which plaintiff ww 
riding had crossed seven sets of tracks before the colli-
sion on the Rio Grande track. There is a distance of 
approximately 25 feet between the seventh track and 
the track where the collision occurred, which provided 
ample space for the motorist to stop his vehicle and wait 
for traffic on the Rio Grande track. 
There was no obstruction to a motorist's vie1r of 
the approaching train. The train had an engine headlight 
burning, the engine bell was ringing and the crossing 
whistle was sounded intermittently as the train 
approached the crossing. Plaintiff's evidence also estab-
lished that the driver of the automobile, Mr. Lawrence, 
did not see the approaching locomotive and did not hear ' 
its bell or whistle. In fact, Mr. Lawrence was unaware 
that there was a train on the track until after the impact. 
An independent eye witness called by plaintiff estab-
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r,.]:1 J that the train was in plain view; that the train 's 
"rn;iJ'.\' hea<llight could he seen for a considerable dis-
tmH·P from tlw direction in which the train was approach-
ing 1:nd that the signals sounded by the train were 
l'hlrl;.· audible. 
Ln 11TencP was intimately familiar with the crossing 
1, ]i!'i ,, tlw accident occurred. He had invariably gone 
·1V1'i' th:s cro8s;ng as he went to and from work and in 
add it ion drove his wife to and from her employment 
,•ach day, five days a week. Thus, he had traversed 
tlw c:·ossing an average of four to six times a day, five 
cl::i:1 s a y·(·c·k for ten years prior to the accident (R. 79, 
Dl). Since he had worked night shift for five years 
:rnmt>diakly i)rior to the accident, he was familiar with 
traffic to be• expected during the late evening hours 
( R. 82). Both Lawrence and Wells had oftentimes waited 
for Rio Grande trains on the main line track of the 
Rio Grande while returning from their work at the close 
of the night shift (R 98,112). Lawrence testified that 
he ''knew there "\Yasn't any crossing watchman after 
11 o 'dock at night"; that he wasn't "relying on any 
crossing watchman being there on this particular occa-
s; o·n" hecause he knew the watchman had left at 11 
o'clock: that he "knew there wasn't any flashing warning 
:-:; g-nals or gates" and further: 
"Q. So as you entered and crossed those tracks, 
you ]mew vou would have to rely on your 
~wn faculties of sight and hearing¥ 
A. Yes, sir." 
( See R. 92-93) 
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The WPather \ms ch•ar and cold and visibility \% 
good (R. 83, 9G, 105). 'rhe crossing \ms lightC'd \rith 
at least three area lights at or nPar the point of tJi,, 
accident ( R. 95). During the Pntirt> course of the auto-
mobile's travPl over the crossing there was nothin~ 
which obstrnctt>d the driver's vi<'w in the direction nt 
the approaching locomotive ( R. 72-7-1, 9-!, 101). Furtlwr, 
there were no other trains on any of the other tra('b 
to distract the attt>ntion of the motorist (R. 93). 
As the automobile approached the crossing, Well> 
had his eyes shut. Lawrence's account of the accidt'nt 
was simply that he had stopped prior to crossing the 
first track; that he had looked both ways and proceeded 
west across the tracks at a speed of 10 miles per hour, 
and that the ne:Xt thing he remembers is that he was 
pla.ced in an ambulance (R. 84, 96, 98). The automobile 
was new, in excellent condition and equipped with power 
brakes. Lawrence testified "I could have stopped on , 
a dime" and "I believe I could have stopped instantly'' 
(R. 97). The windows on the automobile were rolled up 
and clear. The radio was turned off and the two occu-
pants were not conversing (R. 86, 97, 109, 110). The 
evidence discloses that Lawrence drove his automo0bile 
a distance of approximately 150 feet from the point 
where he crossed the first Union Pacific track to the , 
point of impact (Exhibit 1-P). 
As the train approached from the north, its headlight ' 
illuminated the wa~- ahead for a distance of approxi-
mately one city block (R. 143, 1-17). The engine bell 
was ringing (R. 143, 144) and the whistle was sounded 
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in altPnrnte S('<jll<'TIC'(~ commencing at a point approxi-
mat(•lv one• hlock north of Fourth North Street the . ' 
final hlnst still heing sounded as the train entered the 
crossing (R. 144, 150). The engineer's position in the 
]rwo:uotivP made it impossible for him to see the 
appronc-11ing whicle (R. 13G, 137). The fireman had a 
Yiew to t]H> front and also in the direction of the approach-
im: nntomohilt' and he .velled for the engineer to "big 
J11)li• it" 1Yhen the engine was "pretty near to the cross-
:Jtp:" \d1pn•npon the engineer engaged the emergency 
lin:l:e, lmt it was too late to stop the train (R. 69, 70, 136-
1'.\7. 1-1-:2, 1-l-3). The impact occurred about 20 to 30 feet 
onto the crossing (See Exhibit 1-P). The engineer testi-
fiNl that the brakes made a good application and that 
the train made a good stop. The train traveled a distance 
of' :20-!- feet from the point of impact (R. 69). 
An independent eye witness called by the plaintiff 
saw the accident from a point approximately one-half 
block north of the crossing (R. 153, 54). He testified: 
"I distinctly remember the light [on the 
train] ... I was right close to the train and I could 
see kind of a glow from the light; the train was 
quite a ways away at that time, but I knew it was 
coming, and I was hurrying to get to work because 
I was late; consequently, knowing the train was 
coming, I ran for a while there so· I could get 
across the tracks - wouldn't get blocked; quite 
frequently large freights go through and delay 
me even more." (R. 158). 
This witness further testified that as the train 
approached its headlight beam was so intense that he 
turned his back to the train so that the light would 
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not hurt his eyes (R. li55). Fpon turning his back to thr, 
train this witrn~ss first obs<~rved the Lawrence automobile 
entering the crossing (H. 155). \Vhen he first saw the 
automobile, it had not yet crossed the eastern-most haek. 
He did not see the automobile ~;top, although he testified 
that it appeared to have slowed for the crossing (R. 161). 
On the basis of plaintiff's evidence the defendant at 
the close of plaintiff's case moved the court for a direded 
verdict upon the grounds that there was no evidencr 
of negligence on the part of the railroad company which 
could have been a proximate cause of the accident and 
that the negligence of the driver of the automobile wa~ 
the solE pro,ximate cause of the accident. The motion 
was granted and this appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DI-
RECTING A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION" 
That Lawrence ·was guilty of negligence which was 
a proximate cause of the accident is certain and un-
disputed. Wilkinson vs. Short Line Railroad Company. 
35 Utah 100, 99 P. 466; Nuttall vs. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; Ben-
son vs. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790. Defendant contends 
that the negligence of Lawrence was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident and that the plaintiff offered no 
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e,'idence from which a jury could reasonably find that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence in any particular 
which proximately contributed to the accident. 
Plaintiff's theory of the case as set forth on pages 
D and 10 of the Brief of Appellant is that the fireman 
1·itlH·r l~nPw or should have known that Lawrence was 
nrn1,rnre of the approaching engine at a time when the 
fireman and engineer could still take evasive action 
'" Jiich would prevent the collision. It is apparently plain-
tiff's contention that the fireman, having an opportunity 
i!l se(' tlw approaching automobile, should have directed 
till' engineer to make an emergency application of the 
brakes at a time when the train was still far enough from 
i.hP crossing to avoid the collision. This argument is 
foundPd solely upon the factual circumstance that the 
Lawrence automobile approached the Rio Grande track 
for a distance of approximately 150 feet at a speed of 
10 milrs per hour. From this evidence, counsel for plain-
tiff somPhow concludes that the engineer should have 
known what 'Nas in the mind of Lawrence, to wit, to 
proceed directly onto the Rio Grande track immediately 
in the path of the approaching locomotive without stop-
ping or slowing. 
Actually there is no possible way the fireman could 
have known or anticipated such action on the part of the 
motonst and under the circumstances he certainly had 
no duty to anticipate the gross neglect of Lawrence as 
the auto slowly approached the Rio Grande track. There 
was no other rail traffic to concern or distract Lawrence. 
He had a 25-foot safety zone between the seventh U.P. 
track and the Rio Grande track. This was the logical 
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place for an apprnaching vehicle to stop in yielding the 
right-of-'.vay to the train. At the speed he was traveling 1 
Lawrence could have stopped almost instantly. The train 
crew gave every conceivable warning of the approach 
of the locomotive and there was no unusual circumstance 
which in any way served as a warning that the motorist 
was oblivious to the approach of the train. The engineer 
testified that "lots of times" approaching automobiles 
stop almost at the track (R 1-±9). 
Counsel for plaintiff rely upon general principles 
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to the effect that a railroad company has a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care and diligence to prevent injury and 
to act reasonably to utilize the means at hand to avoid 
an a0Cident. These general rules are conceded to be 
correct. They are neither controlling nor persuasive for , 
plaintiff's cause, however, when applied to the facts 
of this case. There is not a single case or authority 
cited in the Brief of Appellant which deals with facts and 
circumstances similar to those before the court in this 
case. The fallacy of plaintiffs theory in this case is 
that it fails to take into account that there was no possible 
means available to the fireman to avoid the accident at 
the time when there first arose a duty on his part to 
be aware of the peril of plaintiff. There is considerable 
case law pertinent to this point. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Gregory 
vs. Denver and Rio Gr:ande Western Railroad Company, 
8 Utah 2d 114, 329 P. 2d 407, determines the very issue 
presented in this case. Coincidentally, the accident in 
the Gregory case occurred at the very same crossing 
!J 
aml on the same track \Yhere the collision occurred in 
tlH' case at bal'. The plaintiff in the Gregory case was 
a passPnger in a vehicle approaching the crossing from 
the same direction as the Lawrence vehicle and the train 
y.·a:-; approaching from the north on the same track. 
Th1::: case was tried before the late Ray VanCott, Jr., 
Judge, sitting with a jury and a motion for directed 
\"(•1·dict was made at the conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
The court granted defendant's motion, dismissed the 
action and the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court 
and affirmed. Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Gregory 
ease upon the contention that the accident in that case 
occurred during daylight hours and the train was travel-
ing at a greater speed. Neither contention has merit 
lwf'ause plaintiff's own evidence shows that the train in 
the cm:e at bar was clearly visible to the approaching 
motorist and that at the speed defendant's train was 
traveling (20 miles per hour) it took in excess of 200 
frpt to make a good stop. 
In deeiding the Gregory case in favor of the railroad 
company, this eourt held that there was no evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably find tnat the railroad 
company was negligent. In a separate concurring opinion 
:21J r. Justice Crockett disposes of the very contention now 
made hy counsel for plaintiff in the case at bar. (8 Utah 
2d lH, 117). 
"I concur in affirming the judgment but upon 
a different ground: that viewing the evidence even 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the negli-
gence of Mr. Gregory was the sole proximate 
cause of the {3ollision. I don't see how reasonaihle 
minds could find to the contrary. He approached 
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this expanse of at lwst eight railroad tracks a.I 
a very slow rate of speed, so that at any instant he 
~oitld have stopped his car within a very feir 
feet. There was no reason why he could not 
have seen the train which wa·s coming from tlif 
north. Under the old and well-established rulr 
this impales him upon the horns of a dilemma: h~ 
either failed to look; or he looked and failed to 
heed. 
The tratin crew had the right to assume tha.f 
Mr. Gregory would stop and would 1wt proceed 
in front of the train, until the time something 
occurred to warn them to the contrary. P{lrficu-
larly in i 0iew of his very slow speed, this iroitld 
not be until he got qitite close to their track, at 
which time the train was practically upon him. 
It is contrary to the generally known laws of 
physics and common sense to expect the train, 
with its greaot weight and momentum, to stop 
within the short distance available after the in-
stant it should have become apparent that Gregory 
wa·s not going t.o stop. After tha.t point was 
reached, there is nothing the crew could have 
done to avoid the collision. And this is true 
whether the train was travelling fast or slow and 
whether the crew saw him or not." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is difficult to conceive of a precedent more closely 
in point than the Gregory case. 
The rationale of Mr. Justice Crockett in the Gregory 
case is supported by other decisions of our Supreme 
Court. One of these decisions is Van Wagoner, et al t!S. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112 Utah 189·, 186 P. 2d 
293. In Van lV aponer the engineer was on the side away 
from the approaching motor vehicle and the brakeman 
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first saw tlte vehicle Yl'l1en it was approximately 160 feet 
from tlw traek but did not realize that the vehicle was 
not going to stop until it was approximately 25 feet 
from the track. In holding for the railroad company 
the majority opinion said: (112 Utah 189, 204) 
"On the other hand, if appellants contend that 
hy keeping a proper lookout, the crew could have 
stopped the train, the evidence establishes other-
1\'ise. Failure to maintain a proper lookout was 
not a jury question." 
In a separate concurring opinion Justice Wolfe dealt with 
rlw issnt> as follows: 
"I think the evidence together with all legiti-
mate inferences therefrom is all one way, that the 
train, even with the best of lookouts, could not be 
stopped after it became apparent to the crew that 
the driver of the truck was not going to stop. 
There simply was not time then for the train to 
be stopped in order to avoid the collision .... 
Net> also Lmi'rc11a vs. Bamberger Railroad Compa;n;y, 3 
Ftah 2d. 2-l-7, 282 P. 2d 335, where the court under similar 
cirrmnstances affirmed defendant's motion for directed 
Yerdict made at the close of plaintiff's case. 
The Reporters are replete with railroad crossing cases 
involving similar circumstances. These decisions fully 
sup11ort the rationale and holding in the Gregory and 
T'all TVagoncr cases supra. In Bordenave vs. Texas and 
Nnc Orleans Railroad Cornpany, 46 So. 2d 525 (La. 1950) 
plaintiff \\'as passenger in an automobile which proceeded ~-
ov<'r a series of six tracks and was struck on the seventh ·.\ 
track. In an opinion reversing judgment for ~eof,aQIJi)l 
"O'tS\ · 
JUN l 9 \9€)/, 
nObo,.~ 
1>... .N l\OIM'-' 
]~ 
tiff, thr' Louisiana Supreme Court said: (-!:(} So. 2d 5~5 . 
530) 
. "It wo:1ld be thoro~ghl>' unrPasonahle to !'(~­
qmre a tram crew to brmg the train to a stop t 
avoid an accident which could onl>, he conten;~ 
plated as possible and no,t imminent." 
Buchthal 1JS. New York Central Ra-ilroad Compaiiy, 
334 Mich. 556, 55 NW 2d 92, is another suit by a passenger 
in an automobile involved in a crossing accidPnt. ln 
dealing with the plaintiff's contention that the railroad 
company had failed to maintain a pro1x•r lookout, tJ1p 
Michigan Supreme Court said: 
"Plaintiff contends that under the admittPr! 
conditions of good visibility the train ere\\-, 11ar-
ticularly the fireman and the engineer, charged 
with the duty of observing persons lmdully cro~>­
ing the tracks and of maintaining a reasonahle 
lookout, should have stopped the train when the 
car became visible. There ·was no duty upon th1 
train crew to slow down the train or stop, even 
if they had seen the car .... 
A case from the l\Iinnesota Supreme Court, Schrolil 
vs. Vall, 245 J\Iinn. 114, 71 NW 2d 843, fortifies Mr. 
Justice Crockett's opinion in Gregory under facts wry 
similar to the case at bar. In that case the court ~aid: 
(71 N ·w2d 843, 847) 
"The issue as to whether the train was kept 
under proper management and control was im-
properly submitted to the jury. Trainmen may 
reasonablv assume that the vehicle approachmg 
a crossing will stop before getting into a position 
of danger. 'They are not required to asswne 
otherwise until, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
they should apprehend danger.' Thus, the fireman 
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was under no duty to notify the engineer of the 
truck's approach until it became apparent that 
th(· driver ~was not going to stop and that a 
collision was imminent. 'rhe fireman testified that 
he expected the truck to stop, and there is no 
n·ason why lw should have expected otherwise 
until the contrary became apparent. The truck 
was prneL•t>ding at a relatively slow speed o.f from 
lfl to :20 miles per hour. It was not driven in a 
manner indicative of an intention not to stop. The 
nncontradicted testimony is that, when it became 
apparent that the truck was not going to stop for 
the crossing, the :fireman immediately commanded 
the engin<:'er to stop. The engine was then only 
:.'.~1 to :;(J fret from the crossing. The train was 
t71e11 so closr that all efforts of the engineer would 
110/; hare m;oided the collision." (emphasis theirs) 
In K ('er;1111 rs. Clz icago M.S. and P.P. Railway Com-
pan1), :2;)1 \Yis. 7, 2.7 X\V 2d 739, the fireman observed 
a truck approaching the crossing for a considerable dis-
tanc1, at a s1wed of 10 to 15 miles per hour but gave 
no warning tu the engineer to make an emergency appli-
eation of the hrnkt·s until the truck was 10 or 15 feet 
from the track. A judgment for the plaintiff was re-
versed upon rationale identical to the quoted portion of 
the opinion in the Grr.r;ory case. In this case the court 
reasoned as follows: (27 KW 2d 739, 742) 
"X othing there said deprives the engine crew 
of the right to assume that a traveler on a highway 
\\·ill look and listen and not go onto the track 
into danger when it is apparent that a train is 
approaching·, and to continue this assumption 
until the contrary becomes apparent or he does 
something to indicate a contrary intention on his 
part. (cases cited) The truck in which deceased 
was riding was traveling at a slow rate of speed, 
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wl~ich is evidenced by the fact that the driver 
said he could have stopped it ·within ten feet. 
There was nothing unusual in the manner in 
which the truck approached the train, nor is there 
any proof of facts \Vhich would cause a reasonable 
person to believe the driver of the truck was not 
aware of the approaching train." 
Another C'?..SP in voint 1s Let:c11dosky VS. ChicaDr), 
Milwaukee, St. Pr111l and P. Railirny, 223 F. 2d 393 
(8th Cir. 1955) "-here a cli'·Pch>d nl'dict in favor of the 
railroad cornvany 1Yas aff rmed upon reasoning as fol-
lows : ( 223 F. 2d 395, 401) 
"'Travelers in motor vehicles frequently and 
custonwril11 drive toward an oncoming train and 
stop .iust before going upon the tracks in order 
to permit the train to proceed on its way. There i.; 
in such conditd, however, no 'peril' until s11cl1 
wayfarer fails t.o stop in a zone of safety. Those 
in charge of the train have a right to assume that 
he will not drive into danger.'" 
"'Under the record, after the perilous posi-
tion of the automobile was in fact discovered by 
the trainmen, the injury could not have been 
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the 
part of the men in charge of the train. The em-
ployees in charge of the train had the right to 
assume that the automobile would not be driven 
heedlesslv on the track ahead of the approaching 
train. It· is a matter of common knowledge that 
automobile drivers frequently drive right up to 
the track before coming to a stop. Under the 
record in this case, it is manifest that the em-
ployees of the defendant, after they ascertained 
that the automobile was not going to stop for the 
crossing, had no time to do more than they did 
15 
in the preventing of the collision.' " (emphasis 
added) 
To the same effect is the reasoning of the Florida 
SuprPme Court in a case involving similar circumstances 
w]H•n• the court in 11! art in vs. Rivers, 72 So. 2d 789, (Fla. 
]~):J-~) oh:,;r•1·ved: (72 So. '.2cl 789, 791) 
"The fireman had the right, from the facts in 
the record here, to believe that the deceased was 
i11 possession of his faculties and his norrnal 
senses, and that with all of the signals of danger, 
the ('J"tent of which were almost overwhelming, 
he u:ould not walk directly into the path of a 
movi11g train. When the fireman finally realized 
that the deceased was not going to stop and was 
11ot going to heed every danger signal possible 
to give, it was too late for any human agency to 
extricate the deceased from the situation that he 
plriced himself in or prevent the de,ath which so 
1111 fortunately occurred. 
"\Ve conclude that the undisputed facts in this 
case entitled the railroad company to a directed 
verdict. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed 
with directions to enter one in favor of the rail-
road company." (Emphasis added) 
Sec• abo Hynek vs. Kewmmee G. R. & W. Railway 
Cumpu1u;, 5:.?l \Viscons;n 319, 29 NvY 2d 45; Gosnell vs. 
Baltimore und Ohio Railroad Company, 189 l\id. 677, 
57 A 2d ;j2~; JI issouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company 
of Tex11s 1:s. Lane, 213 F. 2d 851 (5th Cir. 1954); and 
:lfotthcw"' I's. NnD Orleans Tenninal Company, -15 So. 2d 
5-t7, (La. 1930); Hymel vs. Texas and New Orleans Rail-
ruod Comwwy, l-t-5 So. 2d 138 (La. 1962); Illinois Central 
16 
Bailrond Comprtii1J 1:s. Smith, 243 :Miss. 766, 140 So. 2d 
85G; Rcrdy rs. illissouri, Kan.c:as, Texas Railroad Com-
pany, 34-7 S\V 2d 111, (::\Io. 1961); Brown vs. Louisville 
and Nashville 1-lnilroad Compr111.71, 23-± F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 
193G); N rzr York Ce11tral Bail road Company vs. Monroe. 
188 F. Snrp., 8:2Ci (S.D.N.Y. 19GO). 
It is submitted that defendant's engineer had no 
duty to antic;i;ate that Lawrence would fail to stop 
and yield to the train. Further, under principles of law 
long estahlished in this and other jurisdictions, the en-
gineer under the circumstances of this case had a right 
to assume that the slow-moving vehicle would stop and 
yield to the train and the right to this assumption cnn-
tinued up until the time that the automobile was virtualh 
upon the track, at which time no possible evasive action 
on the part of the train crew could have avoided the 
accident. 
Counsel for plaintiff has asserted some loose argu-
ment in the Appellant's Brief to the effect that plaintiff 
may have been entitled to the benefit of the doctrine 
of last clear chance, and that there is some evidence from 
which a jury conld have reasonably found that additional 
warnings should have been given by the train crew. 
The first of these two contentions is entirely without 
merit because plaintiff did not allege last clear chance 
in his complaint; the pretrial order did not reserve the 
issue· the contention was not made before the court 
' 
below by argument, evidence or request for instruction 
and finally because the contention is squarely at odds 
with the established case law. The plaintiff in the Van 
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TT'a9ow~r case suprn sought the benefit of the doctrine of 
last elear chance but this court held that the doctrine 
wa:o; inapplicable because the train crew had the right 
to assume that the motorist would stop until it became 
apparmt that it was not going to do so and that at the 
time plaintiff's situation of peril became apparent there 
''as tben no "clear opportunity'' for the train crew to 
an1id tlw accident. 
Also, there is no basis for the argument that the 
train crew should have given additional warnings. Coun-
sel for plaintiff embodies this contention in a single 
paragraph on page 4 of the Brief of Appellant, conclud-
ing ·•obviously this is a jury question." The contention 
is founded upon the testimony of the eye witness J aensch 
that "the whistle stopped blowing somewhere between 
his position and the crossing." (Page 14 Appellant's 
Brief.) On cross examination J aensch testified that he 
could not remember where the train was when the last 
signal was sounded and that all he could say was that 
the whistle ended when the train was somewhere between 
him and the crossing (R.160, 161). Under this testimony, 
the last signal could have been made when the train was 
10 or 20 feet from the crossing. The engineer, on the 
other hand, positively testified that the last signal was 
still sounding as the train entered the crossing (R. 150). 
In any event, the undisputed evidence is that both bell 
and whistle were sounded and that the train was both 
visible and audible to persons in the are.a for a con-
siderable distance as it approached the crossing. 
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l'aib to pr!>Yid1· an:· r(·a:-:1>11ald1· l>a:-:i:-: for a l'indin!.'. of 
railroad 111·g·li,!.;t'Jl('t' \\·]1i1·li \\a:-: a Jll'•>':illla11· <'<lll:-:1' of thi· 
a1'!'id1·111 and tliat :-;\l(·li 1·\·id1·rn·1· :-:!11>\1·:-: a:-: a lllattPr 11f 
Im\· tliat tJi,. driY1·r La\\Tt'Jl('t' \\·a:-: !.;11ilt:· of' 111·g-lig-1·nce 
\\ Jii<·Ji \\·a:-: t!it• :-:0]1· prn:-.;i11ial1· t'<lll:-01· 1>!' 1lit• :1t·<'id1·11t and 
ot' plaintif'I'':-: i11.iuri1·:-:. Tli1· .i11d!.;1111·nt h1·low :-:l1onl<l h1· 
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